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Abstract—The advent of intelligent agents who produce and
consume energy by themselves has led the smart grid into the
era of “prosumer”, offering the energy system and customers
a unique opportunity to revaluate/trade their spot energy via
a sharing initiative. To this end, designing an appropriate
sharing mechanism is an issue with crucial importance and
has captured great attention. This paper addresses the pro-
sumers’ demand response problem via energy sharing. Under
a general supply-demand function bidding scheme, a sharing
market clearing procedure considering network constraints is
proposed, which gives rise to a generalized Nash game. The
existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium are proved in
non-congested cases. When congestion occurs, infinitely much
equilibrium may exist because the strategy spaces of prosumers
are correlated. A price-regulation procedure is introduced in
the sharing mechanism, which outcomes a unique equilibrium
that is fair to all participants. Properties of the improved
sharing mechanism, including the individual rational behaviors
of prosumers and the components of sharing price, are revealed.
When the number of prosumers increases, the proposed sharing
mechanism approaches social optimum. Even with fixed number
of resources, introducing competition can result in a decreasing
social cost. Illustrative examples validate the theoretical results
and provide more insights for the energy sharing research.
Index Terms—Prosumer, energy sharing network, game theory,
generalized Nash equilibrium, supply-demand function bidding
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
i Index of prosumers.
k Index of resources.
I Set of prosumers.
K Set of resources.
V Set of buses.
E Set of edges.
fi(·) Disutility function of prosumer i.
si(·) Sharing cost of prosumer i.
Πi(·) Total cost function of prosumer i.
Xi Action set of player i, and X =∏i Xi.
B. Parameters
I Number of prosumers.
K Number of resources of each prosumer.
D0i Fixed amount of energy prosumer i consumes.
pk0i The amount of energy i generates originally.
E0i The amount of energy bought from grid by i.
Di Required load reduction of prosumer i.
a Price elasticity of prosumers
cki Coefficients of the disutility function for pro-
sumer i.
piil Line flow distribution factor from bus i to line l.
Fl Flowlimit for line l.
C. Decision Variables
pki Output adjustment of resource k for prosumer i.
λi Sharing market clearing price for prosumer i.
λ ci Sharing price for prosumer i after regulation.
bi Willingness to pay/buy of prosumer i.
qi Energy transaction in the sharing market.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE advances in distributed renewable generation technol-ogy amid the cost decline of energy storage units have
led to the proliferation of utility-scale wind turbines, rooftop
PV panels and energy storages [1]. Traditional customer is
now transferring to the so-called “prosumer”. Except for their
own needs, prosumers can even supply energy to the grid if the
production is abundant, and offer great potential for enhancing
the efficiency of energy utilization via energy sharing [2]. In
the past decade, the sharing economy has become a heated
topic in both industry and academia. Several third-party shar-
ing platforms, such as Uber for ride-sharing [3], AirBnB for
room-sharing [4] and Upwork for workplace-sharing [5] are
now changing the way of life in modern society. Researchers
endeavor to characterize the strength and drawback of current
sharing schemes and raise more efficient ones.
Numerous empirical studies on sharing have been con-
ducted. A review of the sharing economy was presented in
[6]. Performance of typical sharing platforms is studied in [7],
[8] together with their impact on social welfare. The influence
of sharing prices and subsidies were revealed [9]. The key
issue in energy sharing is designing a proper mechanism or
business model. The desired business model should satisfy the
following conditions: 1) The participant has the free choice
of supply or consume; 2) The sharing market is effectively
cleared, which means supply and demand are balanced while
the system constraints are not violated; 3) Being fair to
all participants. Above empirical studies offer the guidance
for designing sharing mechanism. The existing work can be
divided into three categories according to the model structure.
Stackelberg Game based Sharing. This category follows
a two-level (sequential) decision-making framework. In the
upper level, the operator of a sharing platform announces
buying and selling prices, aiming at optimizing a certain
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objective (e.g., profit or social welfare); In the lower level,
prosumers/costumers decide the sharing profile in response
to the price signal. The two levels constitute a Stackelberg
game. As the operator has the priority, this scheme is called
“Operator-Dominant Sharing”. Researches in this line include
optimal pricing [10], efficiency in matching [11] and equilib-
rium analysis [12], to name just a few. The pricing strategy
for energy sharing among PV prosumers was investigated in
[13], [14]. The existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) were proved. The sharing was further cate-
gorized into direct sharing (within a single time period) and
buffered sharing (across time periods) with the help of energy
storage [15]. A Stackelberg game between the auctioneer and
the residential units was modeled in [16] for energy storage
sharing. A two-sided market based sharing pricing problem
among renters and owners was studied in [12]. Efficiency
loss during the tradeoff between revenue and social welfare
was bounded. Optimal loyalty program for sharing platform
operator was investigated in [17], showing that a linear loyalty
program works better than the one-time sign-up bonuses. For
homogeneous suppliers, a linear loyalty program fits well
while for heterogeneity suppliers, a set of multi-threshold
linear loyalty programs are implementation-friendly. In this
category, sharing participants are price-takers, and the study
focuses on the profit of the platform operator to promote the
business model.
Generalized Nash game based Sharing. This category
follows a single-level (simultaneous) decision-making frame-
work, and the behaviors of participants are modeled as a
generalized Nash game (GNG). The sellers bid the production
costs while the buyers bid the demands to the market at
the same time; then the sharing market is cleared and the
sharing price is given. This scheme is called “Player-Dominant
Sharing”. This kind of studies has a similar structure as the
traditional energy market analysis [18], [19], but the main
difference is that the sharing participants can benefit from
either sharing their resources or consuming it themselves.
Vehicle-to-vehicle charge sharing was analyzed in [20]. A
double-sided bidding mechanism in the mobile cloud was
proposed to encourage users’ participation [21]. In the above
work, roles of the players (a seller or a buyer) are prede-
termined. With the prevalent of prosumers, it is natural that
participants may change their roles over time. The behavior of
networked prosumers with different price preferences on the
trades with their neighbors was considered under peer-to-peer
energy exchange [22]. The economic efficiency of energy hubs
management in a multi-energy system under three schemes
(individual, sharing, aggregation) was compared in [23].
Coalition Game based Sharing. The above two categories
of researches adopt noncooperative game theoretical frame-
works, while this category employs a cooperative game model.
For coalition game based sharing, a set of reallocation rules
is pre-determined by the sharing platform and served as prior
knowledge; then each player makes his decision taking into
account the reallocation he may obtain. The crucial issue in the
kind of study is the proper design of the reallocation rule, such
that all players are willing to cooperate, forming a coalition
game. The famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
is one of the examples [24]. An efficient cost allocation scheme
for energy sharing was proposed in [25]. Coalitional game
theory based local power exchange algorithm was designed
for networked microgrids [26]. A conceptual design for the
demand-side energy resource was provided in [27], where
the coalition surplus is distributed between aggregators and
prosumers. The coalition game based sharing can achieve
social optimum, but for a complex sharing system, a proper
reallocation rule is difficult to obtain.
This work investigates energy sharing from the perspective
of prosumers via generalized Nash game, and thus falls into
the second category. It tries to set forth an efficient sharing
mechanism that allows participants to choose their roles flex-
ibly, and enhances social efficiency while maintaining system
security. It possesses some salient features:
1) Sharing mechanism considering network constraints.
A generic supply-demand function based sharing mechanism
is proposed. It allows prosumers to choose their roles as buyers
or sellers freely. Different from previous works focusing on
profit maximization, the proposed sharing scheme targets at
minimizing the variance of sharing prices and maintaining fair-
ness. When the sharing market is effectively cleared, supply-
demand balance and system constraints are met. The model
turns out to be a generalized Nash game. The existence and
uniqueness of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in non-
congestion cases is proved; an improved sharing mechanism
with price regulation is derived for locating a unique GNE
when congestion occurs.
2) Desired properties of the sharing mechanism. It is
proved that every prosumer has the motivation to take part in
sharing by revealing that his cost under sharing is no worse
than under individual decision-making. This also means a
Pareto improvement is achieved among all prosumers. The
sharing price is shown to have a similar structure as the
locational marginal price (LMP) in power market analysis,
consisting of two parts: one is related to energy balancing
and the other is caused by congestion. The proposed sharing
mechanism approaches social optimum with an increasing
number of participants. Even with a fixed number of resources,
introducing competition can help reducing the total social cost.
3) Deeper insights into the sharing mechanism. Several
examples are given for a better understanding of the proposed
sharing mechanism. A simple case with two prosumers is
used to show that the improved sharing mechanism guarantees
the existence of a unique GNE. Then, the impact of flow
limits is investigated. The proposed sharing mechanism always
results in a fair nodal sharing price. It is also revealed that
getting more prosumers involved and introducing competition
help reduce the total cost. One important factor regarding
competition is the location of lines.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The math-
ematical formulations of energy prosumers and description
of the intuitive energy sharing mechanism are presented in
Section II; Discussions regarding the existence of GNE are
given in Section III; An improved sharing mechanism is
provided in Section IV to ensure the uniqueness of GNE.
Properties of the improved sharing game are revealed in
Section V; Some illustrative examples are given in Section
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VI. Finally, conclusions are summarized in Section VII.
II. GAME MODEL OF ENERGY SHARING
A. Energy Prosumers
A set of prosumers indexed by i ∈ I = {1,2, ..., I} is
considered and each of them possesses K resources, i.e., a
distributed generator (DG), indexed by k ∈K = {1,2, ...,K}.
Let the underlying simple undirected graph be G = (V,E),
where V denotes the set of buses and E the set of edges. The
degree of a vertex of graph G=(V,E) is defined as the number
of edges incident to that vertex. Different from traditional
producers or consumers, prosumers can both produce and
consume energy. The self-balancing condition of prosumer i
is shown below.
∑
k
pk0i +E
0
i = D
0
i (1)
where ∑k pk0i is the energy produced by itself, E
0
i is the
energy purchased from the grid, and D0i is the load demand
it needs to satisfy, which is fixed. We consider all these
prosumers taking part in a demand response program and the
required load reduction for prosumer i is Di, which means E0i
should be reduced by Di. If each prosumer makes the decision
individually, in other words, it can only adjust its resources
output by pki ,∀k to meet the load reduction requirement, we
have ∑k pki = Di. The quadratic function fi(pi) = ∑k cki (pki )2
is adopted to depict the disutility of prosumer i. According to
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the disutility is lower bounded by
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2 ≥ D
2
i
∑
k
1
cki
As the disutility varies among different prosumers, the
individual decision-making scheme may not be the most
efficient one, which means the social total disutility can still
be diminished. An intuitive idea is to allow them to trade with
each other so that the prosumer with lower marginal disutility
can reduce more and buy energy from prosumer with higher
marginal disutility, resulting in a win-win game. Regarding
energy sharing, there are two main concerns: (1) a proper profit
allocation scheme should be designed so that every prosumer is
willing to participate; (2) deploying energy transaction might
violate energy flow limits of the network. To this end, an
effective sharing mechanism that can motivate prosumers to
get involved while maintaining system security is necessary.
Assumption 1. The maximum degree of vertexes of graph
G= (V,E) is finite, and without loss of generality, assume the
upper bound is GD.
B. Generic Supply-Demand Function
A generic supply-demand function is adopted, allowing
prosumers to flexibly alter his role either as a seller or a buyer.
The supply-demand function for prosumer i is
qi =−aλi+bi (2)
where qi is the clearing amount of prosumer i (qi > 0 for
buyers and qi < 0 for sellers); 1a > 0 is the price sensitivity of
...
...
...
P1 P2
P3
Pi
PI
P(I-1)P(I-2)
Sharing Platform
q1 q2
q3
qi
q(I-2)
q(I-1)
qI
... ...b1 bI (q1,λ1) (qI,λI)
Fig. 1. Procedure of the sharing mechanism.
the sharing market, which shows how the bids of prosumers in-
fluence the sharing price; λi is the clearing price for prosumer
i; bi is the bid of prosumer i. The sharing market is said to
be cleared effectively when the following two conditions are
met:
(1) The net quantity ∑i qi = 0, which means
∑
i∈I
(−aλi+bi) = 0 (3)
(2) The energy transaction pattern corresponding to the
market clearance is deliverable, which means there exists a
feasible power flow solution given the offers and demands
of prosumers. Here, direct current (DC) model is used to
calculate the power flow in each line l ∈ L = {1,2, ...,L}.
Since power balancing is ensured by (3), we only need to
impose the following flow limit constraints
−Fl ≤ ∑
i∈I
piil(−aλi+bi)≤ Fl ,∀l ∈L (4)
The sharing platform clears the market subject to constraints
(3) and (4). In view of possible congestions, the sharing price
λi may vary at different buses. To give a fair result, the
objective of the market clearance problem is to minimize the
variance of the sharing prices λi,∀i.
min
1
I ∑i
(
λi− ∑ j
λ j
I
)2
(5)
In consideration of (3), by ignoring the constant terms, the
objective function can be simplified into ∑iλ 2i /I.
C. Energy Sharing Mechanism
Under the settings described above, the energy sharing
market considering network constraints is operated following
three steps and shown in Fig. 1.
Step 1: Estimate the value of price sensitivity factor a via
historical data. Each prosumer submits a bid bi to the sharing
platform, showing his willingness to buy.
Step 2: The sharing platform effectively clears the market
by solving problem (6). Then the sharing price λi and clearing
amount qi are sent back to prosumer i.
min
λi,∀i
1
I ∑i
λ 2i (6a)
s.t. ∑
i
(−aλi+bi) = 0 : η (6b)
−Fl ≤∑
i
piil(−aλi+bi)≤ Fl : α−l ,α+l ,∀l (6c)
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where η , α−l , and α
+
l following a colon are dual variables.
Step 3: The clearing amount of each prosumer is given by
qi(b) = −aλi(b)+bi. If qi(b) > 0, he purchases energy from
the sharing market and the payment is λiqi(b) = λi(−aλi+bi);
otherwise, if qi(b)< 0, he sells energy to the sharing market
and the revenue is −λiqi(b) =−λi(−aλi+bi).
The sharing price λi,∀i is not neccessary to be positive.
A intuitive example is that suppose all cki ,∀i,k are equal and
Di < 0,∀i, which means the prosumers are required to produce
less (or consume more). If there is no congestion, it is easy
to prove that λi < 0,∀i. At this time, a positive qi can be
regarded as selling a positive load to other prosumer, and it is
reasonable that it gets money from the platform.
D. Energy Sharing as A Generalized Nash Game
Given the rule of market clearing, a prosumer can foresee
the clearing result and determine the optimal bidding strategy.
In particular, the problem of prosumer i ∈I becomes
min
pki ,∀k,bi
{
Πi(pi,bi,b−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∑k pki −aλi(b)+bi = Di : βi
}
(7)
where the objective function
Πi(pi,bi,b−i) =∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2+λi(b)(−aλi(b)+bi) (8)
consisting of the disutility fi(pi) :=∑k cki (pki )2 and the sharing
cost si(b) := (−aλi+bi)λi. The constraint in (7) is the energy
balancing condition and βi is the corresponding dual variable.
λi is determined from the sharing market clearing problem (6).
In summary, the game among all prosumers consists of the
following elements:
1) the set of prosumers I = {1,2, ..., I};
2) action sets Xi(b−i)1,∀i, and strategy space X =∏i Xi;
3) Payoff functions Πi(pi(b),bi,b−i),∀i.
For simplicity, denote by G = {I ,X ,Π} the abstract form
of the sharing game (6)-(7). Because the price λi, which
appears in the strategy set Xi, depends on the joint action
b−i of other prosumers, the strategy sets Xi(b−i), i = {1, · · · I}
of individual players are correlated. Therefore, the game
G = {I ,X ,Π} belongs to the category of GNG. This is
different from a standard Nash game in which correlation only
appears in the payoff functions.
III. EQUILIBRIUM OF THE INTUITIVE SHARING GAME
A. Generalized Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, the properties of the equilibrium of the
proposed sharing market are revealed. First, the definition of
a GNE is given as follows.
Definition 1. A strategy profile2 b∗ ∈ X is a Generalized
Nash Equilibrium (GNE) of the sharing game G = {I ,X ,Π}
defined by (6)-(7), if
Πi(p∗i (b
∗),b∗i ,b
∗
−i)≤Πi(pi(bi,b∗−i),bi,b∗−i),∀bi ∈ Xi(b∗−i),∀i
1The subscribe −i means all players in I except i
2Given a collection of xi for i in a certain set A, x denotes the vector
x := (xi; i ∈ A) of a proper dimension with xi as its components
Given the energy production schedule p, define
λ˜i(pi) := 2cki p
k
i +
∑k pki −Di
a(I−1)
and
b˜i(pi) := Di−∑
k
pki +aλ˜i(pi)
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the sharing game G = {I ,X ,Π} has an
isolated GNE (IGNE, which means that no other GNE exists
in a small enough neighborhood of the given GNE), then it
is also unique. Denote by b∗ the unique IGNE and p∗ the
corresponding optimal adjustment, then b∗i = b˜i(pi),∀i ∈ I ,
and p = [p∗i ],∀i is the unique solution of the following
optimization problem:
min
pki ,∀i,k
∑
i
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2+∑
i
(Di−∑k pki )2
2a(I−1) (9a)
s.t. ∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
Di : κ (9b)
−Fl ≤∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )≤ Fl : τ−l ,τ+l (9c)
The proof are given in Appendix A. Proposition 1 offers
a convenient way to identify the IGNE, if one does exist. In
what follows, we discuss the existence of the IGNE.
B. Existence of an Isolated Generalized Nash Equilibrium
Unlike a standard Nash game whose equilibrium exists and
is unique under certain convexity assumptions, a GNG may
possess infinitely much equilibrium which are non-isolated,
because the flow limit constraints complicate the problem. A
simple example is given below.
Example: Suppose there are two prosumers connecting to
the head bus and the tail bus of a line; each of them controls
one resource. Let a= 1, and then the market clearing problem
is
min
1
2
[λ 21 +λ
2
2 ] (10a)
s.t. λ1+λ2−b1−b2 = 0 (10b)
−F1 ≤ λ1−b1 ≤ F1 (10c)
Fix the strategy of prosumer 2, the optimal solution λ1 is a
function of b1, which is
λ ∗1 =

F1+b1, if
b1+b2
2 ≥ F1+b1
b1+b2
2 , if −F1+b1 ≤ b1+b22 ≤ F1+b1
−F1+b1, if b1+b22 ≤−F1+b1
(11)
The first/last one corresponds to the case in which delivered
flow reaches lower/upper bound, and flow constraint is inactive
in the second one. Then, we solve the equivalent problem (9)
considering the following situations:
(1) The network is not congested (constraint (9c) does not
influence the optimal solution). The KKT conditions of (9)
stipulate
λ1 = λ2 = 2c1 p1+ p1−D1 = 2c2 p2+ p2−D2
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b1 = D1− p1+λ1, b2 = D2− p2+λ2
It is easy to check that λ1 = (b1 + b2)/2, which corresponds
to the second situation of (11). As a result, the equilibrium is
uniquely determined. Actually, when there is no congestion,
the sharing market degenerates to the case without network
constraints in [28], where the existence and uniqueness of a
NE have been proved.
(2) Delivered flow reaches the lower/upper bound, e.g., p∗1−
D1 = F1 or p∗1 = D1 +F1, then p
∗
2 = −F1 +D2. The optimal
strategy for prosumer 1 is to choose b∗1 that satisfies (b
∗
1 +
b∗2)/2 = F1 +b
∗
1, which means b
∗
1 = b
∗
2−2F1. In addition, we
can figure out the following relations from the KKT condition
b∗1 = 2c1 p
∗
1 = 2c1(D1+F1)
b∗2 = 2c2 p
∗
2 = 2c2(D2−F1)
Suppose an IGNE exists, we must have λ1 = λ2, which means
there is no congestion. As a result, there is no IGNE.
But it is worth noting that Any (p∗,b∗) that satisfies b∗1 =
−2F + b∗2, p∗1 = D1 +F1 and p∗2 = D2 +F2 are GNEs of this
sharing game. This observation can be generalized in more
general cases.
Proposition 2. If congestion constraint is redundant, then an
IGNE for the sharing game G = {I ,X ,Π} exists; otherwise,
there is none or infinitely many non-isolated GNEs.
Proposition 2 is provided in Appendix C, following the
proof of Proposition 3. It confirms a negative conclusion that
when the network constraints are binding, there is no IGNE.
The reason is the market power of prosumers. Nonetheless, the
existence of IGNE can be retrieved via a minor modification
on the objective function to restrict the market power.
IV. IMPROVED SHARING MECHANISM
Before getting into details of the improved energy sharing
mechanism, we first give the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal output pk∗i ,∀k of prosumer i satisfies
2cki p
k∗
i =
2∑k pk∗i
∑k 1cki
:= mdi (12)
Proof. According to Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, we have
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2 ≥ 1
∑k 1cki
(Di+aλi−bi)2
The equality holds when and only when
c1i p
1
i = c
2
i p
2
i = ...= (∑
k
pki )/(∑
k
1
cki
) := c¯i∑
k
pki
. This completes the proof.
To restrain prosumers’ market power, a price regulation
procedure is included in Step 2 of the sharing procedure in
Section II.C. The ultimate sharing price sent to prosumer i is
λ ci =
max
{
λi,mdi− qia(I−1)
}
, qi ≥ 0
min
{
λi,mdi− qia(I−1)
}
, qi < 0
(13)
It means that the difference between the sharing price λ ci for
prosumer i and his marginal disutility mdi is restricted. To be
specific, when prosumer i buys from the sharing market (qi =
−aλi+bi > 0), the price privilege (mdi−λ ci ) he can get from
sharing is at most (Di−∑k pki )/a(I−1); when he sells to the
sharing market (qi =−aλi+bi < 0), the price privilege (λ ci −
mdi) he can get from sharing is at most (∑k pki −Di)/a(I−1).
The maximum price privilege of prosumer i is related to the
degree of sharing participation reflected by the sharing amount
qi, price sensitivity factor a and the number of prosumers I.
Under this revamped sharing mechanism, the sharing prob-
lem of prosumer i becomes
min
pki ,∀k,bi
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2+ui(λi,bi, pi) (14a)
s.t. ∑
k
pki −aλi(b)+bi = Di (14b)
where
ui(λi,bi, pi) = max(λiqi,(mdi− qia(I−1) )qi) (15)
The total cost is redefined as
Γi(λi,bi, pi) :=∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2+ui(λi,bi, pi)
and λi,∀i is the solution of problem (6). With this improved
sharing mechanism, the existence and uniqueness of GNE are
guaranteed by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The sharing game (14) with (6) has a unique
GNE bˆ and pˆ the corresponding optimal adjustment, where
bˆi = b˜i(pˆi), ∀i ∈I , and pˆi is the unique solution of
min
pki ,∀i,k
∑
i
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2+∑
i
(Di−∑k pki )2
2a(I−1) (16a)
s.t. ∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
Di : κ (16b)
−Fl ≤∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )≤ Fl : τ−l ,τ+l (16c)
The proof can be found in Appendix B. With the price
regulation policy (13), the market equilibrium is well defined
and inherits the properties of the original sharing game.
V. PROPERTIES OF THE IMPROVED SHARING MECHANISM
A. Individual Rationality of Prosumers
After characterizing the GNE, now we can show that every
prosumer has the incentive to share by comparing the costs
associated with the individual decision-making and the GNE.
Let Πi(p∗i ,b∗) be the cost of prosumer i at the GNE of sharing
game G = {I ,X ,Π} defined by (6) and (14), and fi(Di) the
cost of prosumer i under individual decision-making.
Proposition 4. The following relation holds
Πi(p∗i ,b
∗)≤ fi(Di),∀i ∈I (17)
The proof can be found in Appendix D. It guarantees that
with the proposed mechanism, every prosumer can benefit
from sharing, such that a Pareto improvement can be achieved.
This satisfies one of the two main concerns for sharing
mechanism design stated in Section II.A.
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B. Sharing Price
In this subsection, the relationship between the sharing price
λ ci that clears the market, prosumer’s marginal disutility, and
line congestion is revealed.
Proposition 5. Assume b∗ is the GNE of the sharing game
(6) and (14). Then the sharing price at market equilibrium is
given by
λ c∗i = λ
∗
i =−κ∗−∑
l
piilτ∗−l +∑
l
piilτ∗+l
The proof can be found in Appendix E. We can observe
that the sharing price for prosumer i consists of two parts: the
first term −κ∗ corresponds to the marginal cost of energy
and is the same for all prosumers; the remaining terms
−∑l piilτ∗−l +∑l piilτ∗+l reflect prosumer i’s contribution on line
congestion. Such a price exhibits a structure similar to the
locational marginal price [29].
Discussion: Another important issue is whether a subsidy
is needed to run the platform. The sum of the sharing costs
si(b∗) for all prosumers at the equilibrium state is
∑
i
λ c∗i (−aλ ∗i +b∗i ) =∑
i
λ ∗i (−aλ ∗i +b∗i )
= ∑
i
(−κ∗−∑
l
piilτ∗−l +∑
l
piilτ∗+l )(−aλ ∗i +b∗i )
= ∑
i
[−∑
l
piil(−aλ ∗i +b∗i )τ∗−l +∑
l
piil(−aλ ∗i +b∗i )τ∗+l ]
= ∑
l
[−∑
i
piil(−aλ ∗i +b∗i )τ∗−l +∑
i
piil(−aλ ∗i +b∗i )τ∗+l ]
= ∑
l
Fl(τ∗−l + τ
∗+
l )≥ 0 (18)
If there is no congestion in the network, then the sum of si(b∗)
is equal to zero, which means that the sharing market is self-
balanced economically. In the presence of congestion, after
sharing, not only every prosumer is better-off and a positive
payment is given to the sharing platform, which is similar to
the renown concept of financial transmission right (FTR) [29].
C. Social Efficiency
According to Proposition 4, the proposed sharing mech-
anism can improve the efficiency compared with individual
decision-making. In this subsection, we show that how close
is the efficiency of the proposed mechanism compared with
the centralized decision making problem:
min
pi,∀i∈I
∑
i
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2 (19a)
s.t. ∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
Di (19b)
−Fl ≤∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )≤ Fl (19c)
Definition 2. (Socially Optimum) p¯ is socially optimal if p¯
is the unique optimal solution of (19).
Proposition 3 claims that the GNE of the modified sharing
game always exists and can be extracted from the optimal
solution of problem (16). Problems (16) and (19) seem alike
except for the second term ∑i(Di−∑k pki )2/2a(I− 1) in the
objective function. This term approaches zero when I→∞, and
thus problem (16) is identical to the social optimal problem
(19). The gap between sharing and the social optimum when
I→ ∞ is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let b∗(I) be the GNE of (6),(14), p∗(I) the
corresponding optimal adjustment and p¯(I) be the socially
optimal solution of (19). Then, we have
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (I))≥∑i∈I fi(p¯i(I))
and the average cost difference
lim
I→∞
1
I
[
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (I))−∑i∈I fi(p¯i(I))
]
= 0
The proof can be found in Appendix F. It declares that the
proposed sharing mechanism can approach the social optimum
with an increasing number of market participants.
D. Role of Competition
We have shown that social efficiency can be enhanced by
employing more prosumers, and thus more resources, without
changing the resource endowment of original prosumers. In
this part, we consider another situation that the total number
of resource is fixed and show that introducing competition can
benefit social efficiency.
Let (I,K,D) denotes a scenario that there are I prosumers
and each of them possesses K resources, the demand ad-
justment for them is D := {Di,∀i}. Assume that the GNE
under scenario (I,K,D) is b∗ and p∗ the corresponding optimal
adjustment. We introduce competition in the following way:
The resource prosumer i owns is equally distributed to M
prosumers (K is divisible by M) and the demand adjustment
accordingly, and Dmi ,∀m satisfies
mK
M
∑
j= (m−1)KM +1
p j∗i −Dmi =
1
M
(∑
k
pk∗i −Di),m = {1,2, ...,M},∀i
After introducing competition, I
′
= MI, K
′
= K/M and
D
′
:= {Dmi ,∀i,m}. We call the new scenario (I
′
,K
′
,D
′
) a equal
partition of scenario (I,K,D). With this equal partition rule,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Suppose (p∗(I,K,D),b∗(I,K,D)) is the unique
GNE of the sharing problem (14) and (6) with I > 1, then for
scenario (I,K,D) and its equal partition (I
′
,K
′
,D
′
), we have
I
∑
i=1
fi(p∗i (I,K,D))≥
I
′
∑
i=1
fi(p∗i (I
′
,K
′
,D
′
)) (20)
The proof can be found in Appendix G. It demonstrates that
the system is the most efficient when all resources are pos-
sessed by one prosumer; otherwise, introducing competition
in an equal partition way can reduce the total social cost and
thus enhance the social efficiency.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, numerical experiments are presented to
illustrate theoretical results. First, a simple case is used to
show the basic setup. Then, the impacts of several factors are
analyzed, including the impact of network constraints, number
of prosumers as well as the role of competition.
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Fig. 2. Best response curves in different situations.
A. Benchmark Case
The simplest case with only two prosumers is taken as an
illustrative example. Each of them owns one resource and is
located at one side of a line. p1/p2 is the resource output
of prosumer 1/2. The price sensitivity factor is a = 1 and the
cost coefficients are c1 = 2.5, c2 = 3.5. The required demand
adjustments are D1 = 3 and D2 = 7. First we let F1 = 10 which
is the case without congestion, and the best response curves
of two prosumers are plotted at the left side of Fig. 2. A
unique generalized Nash equilibrium (b∗1,b
∗
2) = (27.14,32.00)
and (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (5.43,4.57) is given by the intersection of two
curves. Then we decrease the flow limit and choose F1 = 2,
creating a case with congestion. With the intuitive sharing
mechanism in Section II, the best response curves are shown
in the middle of Fig. 2. Two curves coincide meaning that
there are infinity many GNEs but no IGNE. With the improved
sharing mechanism in Section IV, the best response curves are
drawn in the right-hand side of Fig. 2, giving an unique GNE
(b∗1,b
∗
2) = (25.00,35.00) and (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = (5,25,5,35).
B. Impact of Flow Limit
In this section, the impact of flow limit is investigated. A
simple network with three prosumers, each at one vertex of
a triangle, is tested with c = [2.5,3.5,4.5] and D = [3,7,11].
We change the flow limit of all lines simultaneously from 1 to
3.5, the change of nodal prices under social optimal (SCO) and
sharing market equilibrium (SMK) as well as the social total
costs are shown in Fig. 3. Both social total costs decrease with
relaxing flow limit, and their relative differences are all less
than 0.008%, showing that the proposed sharing mechanism
can achieve a near-optimal solution, which is efficient. The
variances of nodal prices under SCO and SMK decline with
a looser restriction on energy flows. Under a specific flow
limit, the variance of nodal prices under SMK is smaller
than that under SCO, reducing the price discrimination among
prosumers.
C. Impact of the Number of Prosumers
We change the number of prosumers I from 2 to 30. The
parameters ci, Di are randomly chosen and 10 scenarios are
tested. The topology of the test system is shown in Fig.4.
Average cost gaps between SCO and SMK with different I
are given in Fig. 5. We can observe that the average total cost
under sharing is always larger than that under social optimum,
but the gap converges to zero with the increase of I.
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Fig. 5. Average relative difference of social total costs between SCO and
SMK.
D. Impact of Competition
A special case, in which all prosumers own the same number
of resources and are split at the same time, is analyzed in
Section V, and Proposition 7 asserts that competition helps
reducing the social total cost. In this subsection, more general
cases are considered. A network with 6 lines and 16 resources
is tested. First, we change the flow limit to let each line to be
congested one-by-one, and then observe how the social total
cost will change when competition is introduced to both ends
of different lines. The results are shown in Fig. 6. We can
find that with the introduction of competition, the total cost
always becomes lower. When different lines are congested, the
relative relation of introducing competition to different lines
remains the same, showing that the position of a line rather
than whether it is congested or not is an important factor when
we choose where to add competition.
In the second case, competition is added to node 1 →
5→ 4→ 2→ 6→ 7 sequentially. To eliminate the impact of
amplitude, the change of total costs after scaling are presented
in Fig.7. Results show a declining trend in the total cost when
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the resources are distributed among an increasing number of
prosumers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prosumers endowed with distributed generation facilities
are becoming popular recently, inspiring a new paradigm for
energy management via a sharing market. A well-designed
sharing mechanism is imperative. This paper comes up with
a generic supply-demand function based sharing mechanism
considering network constraints and fairness of prices. Price
regulation is introduced to restrict market power, ensuring the
existence of market equilibrium. Our research discloses some
fundamental properties of the sharing mechanism:
1) The improved sharing mechanism can ensure the exis-
tence and uniqueness of a GNE; and a Pareto improvement is
achieved among prosumers via sharing.
2) The average cost gap between SMK and SCO tends to
zero when the number of prosumers approaches infinity.
3) Competition helps reducing the total social cost and one
important factor regarding competition is the location of lines.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. The KKT condition of the platform’s sharing clearing
problem (6) is
2
I
λi+aη+a∑
l
piilα−l −a∑
l
piilα+l = 0 : εi (A.1a)
∑
i
(aλi−bi) = 0 : δ (A.1b)
−Fl ≤∑
i
(piil(−aλi+bi))≤ Fl : γ−l ,γ+l (A.1c)
α−l ≥ 0,α+l ≥ 0 : φ−l ,φ+l (A.1d)
α−l [Fl +∑
i
piil(−aλi+bi)] = 0 : ρ−l (A.1e)
α+l [Fl−∑
i
piil(−aλi+bi)] = 0 : ρ+l (A.1f)
After replacing the lower-level problem with its KKT condi-
tion, the prosumer i’s problem comes down to a mathematical
program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The sharing
game (6)-(7) renders an equilibrium problem with equilibrium
constraints (EPEC), and (b∗,λ ∗) is a strong stationary point
of the EPEC if for each i ∈I , (b∗i ,λ ∗) is a strong stationary
point for the MPEC for prosumer i with fixed b∗−i, and satisfies
the following KKT conditions.
2cki p
k
i +βi = 0 (A.2a)
−2aλi+bi−aβi+ 2I εi+aδ
+a∑
l
piilγ−l −a∑
l
piilγ+l = 0 (A.2b)
λi+βi−δ −∑
l
piilγ−l +∑
l
piilγ+l = 0 (A.2c)
2
I
ε j +aδ +a∑
l
pi jlγ−l −a∑
l
pi jlγ+l = 0 (A.2d)
a∑
i
εi = 0 (A.2e)
a(∑
l
piil)(∑
i
εi)−φ−l = 0 (A.2f)
−a(∑
l
piil)(∑
i
εi)−φ+l = 0 (A.2g)
l ∈ I1 : [Fl +∑
l
piil(−aλi+bi)] = 0 (A.2h)
l /∈ I1 : 0≤ [Fl +∑
l
piil(−aλi+bi)]⊥ γ−l ≥ 0 (A.2i)
l ∈ I2 : [Fl−∑
l
piil(−aλi+bi)] = 0 (A.2j)
l /∈ I2 : 0≤ [Fl−∑
l
piil(−aλi+bi)]⊥ γ+l ≥ 0 (A.2k)
l ∈ I3 : α−l = 0 (A.2l)
l /∈ I3 : 0≤ α−l ⊥ φ−l ≥ 0(A.2m)
l ∈ I4 : α+l = 0 (A.2n)
l /∈ I4 : 0≤ α+l ⊥ φ+l ≥ 0 (A.2o)
l ∈ I1
⋂
I3 : γ−l ≥ 0,φ−l ≥ 0 (A.2p)
l ∈ I2
⋂
I4 : γ+l ≥ 0,φ+l ≥ 0 (A.2q)
Together with the balancing constraint in (7) and (A.1). Here,
the sets I1, I2, I3 and I4 are defined as
I1 := {l|Fl +∑
l
piil(−aλi+bi) = 0}
I2 := {l|Fl−∑
l
piil(−aλi+bi) = 0}
I3 := {l|α−l = 0}
I4 := {l|α+l = 0}
A stationary point of the EPEC problem (6)-(7) corresponds
to an isolated GNE of the sharing game. However, even though
the KKT condition (A.2) is not met, it is still possible that b∗
is a GNE, but not an isolated one.
The KKT condition of problem (9) is
2cki p
k
i +
∑k pki −Di
a(I−1) +κ+∑l
piilτ−l −∑
l
piilτ+l = 0 (A.3a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
Di (A.3b)
0≤ (∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )+Fl)⊥ τ−l ≥ 0 (A.3c)
0≤ (−∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )+Fl)⊥ τ+l ≥ 0 (A.3d)
If b∗ is an isolated GNE of the sharing game and p∗ the
corresponding optimal adjustment. Then it satisfies the KKT
conditions (A.2). If we add up (A.2b) and (A.2d) for all j 6= i,
together with (A.2e), we have
−2aλ ∗i +b∗i −aβ ∗i +aIδ ∗
+aI∑
l
piilγ∗−l −aI∑
l
piilγ∗+l = 0 (A.4)
(A.4)+aI(A.2c) gives
a(I−1)λ ∗i +Di−∑
k
pk∗i +a(I−1)β ∗i = 0 (A.5)
With (A.2a) we have
2cki p
k∗
i +
∑k pk∗i −Di
a(I−1) = λ
∗
i (A.6)
From (A.1a), we know that
2
I
[2cki p
k∗
i +
∑k pk∗i −Di
a(I−1) ]+a∑l
piilα∗−l −a∑
l
piilα∗+l =−aη∗(A.7)
which is a constant among all prosumers. Let κ = aI2 η
∗, τ±l =
aI
2 α
∗±
l , it is easy to check that the KKT conditions (A.3) are
met. And obviously we have b∗i = b˜i(p∗i ). Since problem (9) is
a strictly convex optimization problem, its optimal solution is
unique, so as the isolated GNE. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. Define yi = −aλi + bi, then the sharing problem is
equivalent to Prosumer i’s decision-making:
min
pki ,∀k,bi
∑
k
cki (p
k
i )
2+
1
a
yi(b)(−yi(b)+bi) (B.1a)
s.t. ∑
k
pki + yi = Di (B.1b)
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Sharing platform’s problem:
min
yi,∀i ∑i
(yi−bi)2 (B.2a)
s.t. ∑
i
yi = 0 (B.2b)
−Fl ≤∑
i
piilyi ≤ Fl (B.2c)
Before proving Proposition 3, we first give the following
lemmas. Fix other prosumers’ strategies b−i and varies bi.
Suppose y∗i (bi) is the optimal solution given by (B.2). Denote
the objective function of (B.2) as g(y,b) and g(y,b)= ||y−b||2.
Lemma 2. y∗i (bi) is continuous in bi.
Proof. Recall the Maximum Theorem, which says: Let Y and
Bi be metric spaces, g : Y × Bi → R be a function jointly
continuous in its two arguments, and C : BiY be a compact-
valued correspondence, let
y∗(bi) = argmax{−g(y,bi)|y ∈C(bi)}
If C is continuous at some point bi, then y∗ is non-empty,
compact-valued, and upper hemi-continuous at bi.
Here, first g(y,bi,b−i) is continuous both in y and bi. The
feasible region of (B.2) is independent of bi and thus C
is a a compact-valued correspondence. Therefore, y∗(bi) is
upper hemi-continuous at bi. As (B.2) is a strictly convex
optimization problem and has a unique solution, so upper
hemi-continuous implies continuous.
Lemma 3. We have
0≤ ∆y
∗
i
∆bi
≤ I−1
I
(B.3)
Proof. For prosumer i, fix b−i. Assume that bi changes to
bi+∆bi and y∗i changes to y∗i +∆y∗i accordingly. Without loss
of generality, suppose ∆bi > 0.
First, we prove the left hand side inequality. If ∆y∗i < 0, then
construct y
′
= y∗+ 12∆y
∗. Then
g(y∗,b)+g(y∗+∆y∗,b+∆b)
= (y∗i −bi)2+∑
j 6=i
(y∗j −b j)2+(y∗i +∆y∗i −bi−∆bi)2
+∑
j 6=i
(y∗j +∆y
∗
j −b j)2 (B.4)
g(y∗+
1
2
∆y∗,b)+g(y∗+
1
2
∆y∗,b+∆b)
= (y∗i +
1
2
∆y∗i −bi)2+∑
j 6=i
(y∗j +
1
2
∆y∗j −b j)2
+(y∗i +
1
2
∆y∗i −bi−∆bi)2+∑
j 6=i
(y∗j +
1
2
∆y∗j −b j)2(B.5)
According to Jensen Inequality, we have
(y∗j −b j)2+(y∗j +∆y∗j −b j)2
2
≥ (y∗j +
1
2
∆y∗j −b j)2 (B.6)
and because
(y∗i −bi)2+(y∗i +∆y∗i −bi−∆bi)2− (y∗i +
1
2
∆y∗i −bi)2
−(y∗i +
1
2
∆y∗i −bi−∆bi)2
=
(∆y∗i )2
2
−∆y∗i ∆bi > 0 (B.7)
As a result, we have
g(y∗,b)+g(y∗+∆y∗,b+∆b)
> g(y∗+
1
2
∆y∗,b)+g(y∗+
1
2
∆y∗,b+∆b) (B.8)
which is contradict to the assumption that y∗ is the optimal
solution corresponding to b and y∗+∆y∗ is the optimal solution
corresponding to b+∆b. So we have ∆y∗i /∆bi ≥ 0.
Next, we prove the right hand side inequality. If we have
∆y∗i /∆bi > (I−1)/I. First, because the feasible region of (B.2)
is a polyhedron and g(y,b) = ||y− b||2, so the optimal y is
piece-wise linear in b. In each segment with the direction of
∆y′ , y′ is the optimal corresponding to b′ when and only when
(y
′−b′)⊥ ∆y′ . When ∆b is small enough, y∗ and y∗+∆y∗ fall
in the same segment. Due to the optimality, we have (y∗−b)⊥
∆y∗ and (y∗+∆y∗−b∗−∆b∗)⊥ ∆y∗.
Denote a vector y˜ = (y∗1 − 1I ∆bi, ...,y∗i + I−1I ∆bi, , ...,y∗I −
1
I ∆bi). Suppose yˇ = (y
∗
1 +α∆y
∗
1, ...,y
∗
i +α∆y∗i , ...,y∗I +α∆y∗I ).
α is a parameter such that (yˇ− y˜)⊥ ∆y∗, which means
(α∆y∗1+
1
I
∆bi, ...,α∆y∗i −
I−1
I
∆bi, , ...,α∆y∗I +
1
I
∆bi)
· (∆y∗1, ...,∆y∗i , ...,∆y∗I ) = 0 (B.9)
We can get
0≤ α = ∆bi∆y
∗
i
∑
j
(∆y∗j)2
<
∆bi∆y∗i
(∆y∗i )2+
1
I−1 (∆y
∗
i )
2
< 1 (B.10)
So that yˇ is a feasible point for problem (B.2) and yˇ 6= (y∗+
∆y∗). Since (y∗−b)⊥ ∆y∗ and ∑i∆y∗i = 0, so we have
[(b+∆b)− y˜] ·∆y∗
= (b1− y∗1+
∆bi
I
, ...,bI− y∗I +
∆bi
I
)
·(∆y∗1,∆y∗2, ...,∆y∗I )
= 0 (B.11)
As a result, we have (yˇ− b− ∆b) ⊥ ∆y∗ and (y∗ + ∆y∗ −
b∗−∆b∗) ⊥ ∆y∗, which is contradict to yˇ 6= (y∗+∆y∗). This
completes the proof.
With Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can prove Proposition
3. ui(λi,bi, pi) can be rewritten as
ui(yi,bi, pi)
= max{1
a
yi(−yi+bi),(mdi+ ∑k p
k
i −Di
a(I−1) )yi}
We only prove the case when yi > 0, the other situation
when yi ≤ 0 can be proven in the same way. Because y∗i (bi) is
a piece-wise linear function of bi, so in each segment, y∗i (bi)
is derivable.
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If yi > 0 and 1a yi(−yi+bi)> (mdi+ pi−Dia(I−1) )(Di− pi), which
means
1
a
(−yi+bi)> 2c¯i(Di− yi)− yia(I−1) (B.12)
The left-hand side is increasing in bi while the right-hand side
is decreasing in bi, two parts are equal when and only when
bi = b∗i . Then if bi > b∗i , we have Γi(yi,bi, pi) = (∑k cki (pki )2+
1
a yi(−yi+bi))max = c¯i(Di− yi)2+ 1a yi(−yi+bi).
dΓi
dbi
= −2c¯i(Di− yi)dyidbi −
2
a
yi
dyi
dbi
+
yi
a
+
bi
a
dyi
dbI
≥ − yi
a(I−1)
dyi
dbi
− yi
a
dyi
dbi
+
yi
a
≥ −yi
a
+
yi
a
≥ 0 (B.13)
It means when bi > b∗i , in each segment, the cost function is
increasing; and because the cost function is continuous, so Γi
is increasing when bi > b∗i .
If bi < b∗i , then Γi(yi,bi, pi) = ∑k cki (pki )2 + (mdi +
∑k pki−Di
a(I−1) )(Di− pi) = c¯i(Di− yi)2+(2c¯i(Di− yi)− yia(I−1) )yi.
dΓi
dbi
= −2c¯i(Di− yi)dyidbi +2c¯iDi
dyi
dbi
−4c¯iyi dyidbi −
2yi
a(I−1)
dyi
dbi
= −2c¯iyi dyidbi −
2yi
a(I−1)
dyi
dbi
≤ 0 (B.14)
This implies that when bi < b∗i , Γi is decreasing. In conclusion,
the cost Γi reaches its minimum at bi = b∗i .
We have proved that b∗ is a GNE of the sharing game. Next,
we prove that it is the unique one. Given any b−i, it has been
proved that the optimal strategy of prosumer i is to choose a
bi such that the resulting yi, pi satisfies that
bi = 2ac¯i∑
k
pki +
I−2
(I−1) (Di−∑k
pki ), yi = Di−∑
k
pki
Then we show that this can always be achieved. Assume y∗′
is the optimal solution of the following optimization problem
min
i
( 1I−1 yi+2ac¯iyi−2ac¯iDi)2
2ac¯i+ 1I−1
+∑
j 6=i
(y j−b j)2(B.15)
s.t. ∑
i
yi = 0 (B.16)
−Fl ≤∑
i
piilyi ≤ Fl (B.17)
If we let bi = 2ac¯i(Di− yi)+ I−2(I−1)yi, it is easy to check that
yi−bi = ( 1I−1 +2ac¯i)yi−2ac¯iDi.
By comparing the KKT condition of the lower level problem
(B.2) and problem (16), it is easy to show that p∗ is the optimal
solution of (16), which is unique. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. When there is no congestion, it degenerates to the situ-
ation in [28], where a unique NE always exists. When there is
congestion, if there exists an IGNE, according to Proposition 1,
we have 1a y
∗
i (−y∗i +b∗i ) = (2c¯i∑k pk∗i + ∑k p
k∗
i −Di
a(I−1) )(Di−∑k pk∗i ).
The derivative dΓidbi must be zero at the optimal point. Thus, we
have
dΓi
dbi
= −2c¯i(Di− yi)dyidbi −
2
a
yi
dyi
dbi
+
yi
a
+
bi
a
dyi
dbI
= − yi
a(I−1)
dyi
dbi
− yi
a
dyi
dbi
+
yi
a
(C.1)
dΓi
dbi
= 0 when and only when dy
∗
i
db∗i
= I−1I . According to (B.10),
we have
dy∗j
db∗i
=− 1I . Symmetrically, we have
dy∗i
db∗i
=
I−1
I
,∀i
dy∗j
db∗i
=
−1
I
,∀i,∀ j 6= i (C.2)
Without loss of generality, assume the binding constraint is
∑
i
piil′ yi = Fl′ (C.3)
Take the derivative with respect to bi,∀i, it is easy to conclude
that piil′ ,∀i equal the same pil′ . Suppose line l
′
links the bus n
and m, then
[pil′ , ...,pil′ ] = [0, ...,1n
, ...,−1
m
, ...,0]B−1 (C.4)
where B is a full-rank matrix with Bi j =− 1xi j and Bii =
1
xi0
+
∑ j 6=i 1xi j , xi j > 0,∀i, j. With (C.4) we can get that
[pil′ , ...,pil′ ]B = [0, ...,1n
, ...,−1
m
, ...,0] (C.5)
which implies xi0 = 1pi
l′
and x j0 =− 1pi
l′
, which is contradict to
xi j > 0,∀i, j. As a result, when there is congestion, no IGNE
exists. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. Given other prosumers’ strategies ( j 6= i), first we solve
the following optimization problem
min
λ j , j 6=i
1
I ∑j 6=i
λ 2j (D.1a)
∑
j 6=i
(aλ j−b j) = 0 : η ′ (D.1b)
−Fl ≤∑
j 6=i
pi jl(−aλ j +b j)≤ Fl : α−′l ,α+
′
l (D.1c)
Suppose the optimal solution and the corresponding dual
variables are λ ∗j , η
′∗,α±
′∗
l . Then if prosumer i bids bi =
a2I
2 (−η
′∗ −∑l piilα−
′∗
l +∑l piilα
+′∗
l ), then by comparing the
KKT condition (A.1a), it is easy to check the corresponding
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aλi = −bi. At this time, the cost of prosumer i is the same
as when he makes decision individually. Since each prosumer
i solves an minimization problem, a Pareto improvement can
be achieved. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. If b∗ is the GNE of the sharing game (6) and (14),
then it satisfies the KKT conditions (A.2). Then in Appendix
A, we prove show that
λ ∗i = 2c
k
i p
k
i +
∑k pki −Di
a(I−1)
=
aI
2
[−η∗−∑
l
piilα∗−l +∑
l
piilα∗+l ]
= −κ∗−∑
l
piilτ∗−l +∑
l
piilτ∗+l (E.1)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof. As b∗ is the GNE of the sharing game (6) and (14),
p∗ the corresponding optimal adjustment, according to Propo-
sition 1, p∗ is the optimal solution of problem (16). p¯ is
the optimal solution of problem (19). The feasible region of
problem (16) and (19) are the same, so p∗ is a feasible solution
of problem (19). Due to the optimality, we have
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (I))≥∑i∈I fi(p¯i(I))
Then, we prove the second statement. The net injection of
prosumer i is ∑k pki −Di, which is sum of the energy flows of
lines connected to i. Denote Fˆ := max{Fl ,∀l}. According to
Assumption 1, the degree of node i is no more than GD and
the flow of each line is within [−Fˆ , Fˆ ], so
−GDFˆ ≤∑
k
pki −Di ≤ GDFˆ (F.1)
For any given ε > 0, we choose a large enough number
I0 := aεGDFˆ +1. Then for arbitrary number I > I0, there is
1
I
[∑
i
fi(p∗i (I))−∑
i
fi(p¯i(I))]
=
1
I ∑i
[ fi(p∗i (I))+
(Di−∑k pk∗i )2
2a(I−1)
− fi(p¯i(I))− (Di−∑k p
k∗
i )
2
2a(I−1) ]
≤ 1
I ∑i
[ fi(p¯i(I))+
(Di−∑k p¯ki )2
2a(I−1)
− fi(p¯i(I))− (Di−∑k p
k∗
i )
2
2a(I−1) ]
=
1
I
1
2a(I−1)∑i
[(Di−∑
k
p¯ki )
2− (Di−∑
k
pk∗i )
2]
≤ 1
I
1
2a(I−1)∑i
[|Di−∑
k
p¯ki |2+ |Di−∑
k
pk∗i |2]
≤ G
DFˆ
a(I−1) ≤ ε (F.2)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof. The KKT condition of the sharing game under compe-
tition is as follows.
2cki p
k
i +
∑
k
pki −Di
a(I−1) +κ+∑l
piilτ−l −∑
l
piilτ+l = 0 (G.1a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
Di (G.1b)
0≤ (∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )+Fl)⊥ τ−l ≥ 0 (G.1c)
0≤ (−∑
i
piil(Di−∑
k
pki )+Fl)⊥ τ+l ≥ 0 (G.1d)
If the resource prosumer i owns is equally distributed to M
prosumers (K is divisible by M), and satisfies that
mK
M
∑
j= (m−1)KM +1
p ji −Dmi =
1
M
(
K
∑
k=1
pki −Di),m = {1,2, ...,M},∀i
Then it is easy to find that
2c ji p
j
i +
mK
M
∑
j= (m−1)KM +1
p ji −Dmi
a(I−1)/M +κ+∑l
piilτ−l
−∑
l
piilτ+l = 0,m = {1,2, ...,M},∀i (G.2a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
∑
m
Dmi (G.2b)
0≤ (∑
i
piil(∑
m
Dmi −∑
k
pki )+Fl)⊥ τ−l ≥ 0 (G.2c)
0≤ (−∑
i
piil(∑
m
Dmi −∑
k
pki )+Fl)⊥ τ+l ≥ 0 (G.2d)
which means p ji is the solution of the following optimization
problem
min
pi,∀i ∑i ∑m ∑j
c ji (p
j
i )
2+∑
i
∑
m
(Dmi −
mK
M
∑
j= (m−1)KM +1
p ji )
2
2a(I−1)/M
s.t. ∑
i
∑
k
pki =∑
i
∑
m
Dmi
−Fl ≤∑
i
piil(∑
m
Dmi −∑
k
pki )≤ Fl (G.3a)
Denote
f (p) =∑
i
∑
m
∑
j
c ji (p
j
i )
2
w(p) =∑
i
∑
m
(Dmi −
mK
M
∑
j= (m−1)KM +1
p ji )
2
2a(I−1)/M
h(p) =∑
i
∑
m
(Dmi −
mK
M
∑
j= (m−1)KM +1
p ji )
2
2a(MI−1)
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, FEB. 2019 13
Then w(p) = (I−1)(MI−1)M h(p). Suppose p
1∗ the optimal solution
before partition, and p2∗ the optimal solution after partition.
If we have f (p1∗)≤ f (p2∗). Due to optimality, we have
f (p1∗)+w(p1∗)≤ f (p2∗)+w(p2∗)
which means
w(p1∗)−w(p2∗) ≤ f (p2∗)− f (p1∗)
≤ (MI−1)M
I−1 [ f (p
2∗)− f (p1∗)]
which means
h(p1∗)−h(p2∗) = I−1
(MI−1)M [w(p
1∗)−w(p2∗)]
≤ f (p2∗)− f (p1∗)
showing that
f (p1∗)+h(p1∗)≤ f (p2∗)+h(p2∗)
which is contradict to the assumption that p2∗ is the optimal
solution after partition. As a result, after partition, the total
cost decreases.
